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This essay refracts the criminal conviction and reparations order of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) in the Al Mahdi case into the much broader frame of increas-
ingly heated public debates over the protection, removal, defacement, relocation, dis-
play and destruction of cultural heritage in all forms: monuments, artefacts,
language instruction, art and literature.What might the work product of the ICC in
the Al Mahdi proceedings ç and international criminal law more generally ç add,
contribute or excise from these debates? This essay speculatively explores connections
between the turn to penal law to protect cultural property and the transformative im-
pulses that undergird transitional justice which, in turn, often insist upon cultural
change, including to cultures of oppression and impunity. Along the way, this essay
also unpacks thorny questions as to how to value cultural property; how to determine
what, exactly, constitutes the kind of property whose destruction should be crimina-
lized; and which ‘cultures’ should be protected by ‘whom’ and in ‘whose’ interests.
‘Culture is who we are.’1
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1. Introduction
On 27 September 2016,Trial Chamber VIII of the International Criminal Court
(ICC or ‘the Court’) unanimously sentenced Ahmad al-Faqi Al Mahdi to nine
years’ imprisonment after convicting him of the war crime of intentionally at-
tacking cultural property in Timbuktu, Mali.2 Al Mahdi pled guilty as a co-per-
petrator. His is the lowest sentence the ICC has thus far issued. On 17 August
2017, the Trial Chamber issued its reparations order in the same case. It found
Al Mahdi liable for 2.7 million euros for individual and collective reparations.3
In 2012, Al Mahdi jointly organized the destruction of structures (including
mausoleums) of a religious and historical character in Timbuktu. An emblem-
atic city, Timbuktu served as a trading entrepo“ t in the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries. It constituted a focal point for the spread of Islam in the region,
housing libraries and manuscripts of great intellectual and spiritual renown.
Acting in the name of fundamentalist Salafism, Al Mahdi destroyed shrines to
Sufi saints situated above tombs.4 Many were made of mud and brick. The
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
had recognized all but one of these structures as world heritage sites.
Timbuktu indeed was inscribed on the World Heritage List in 1998.5 Al Mahdi
was charged solely in relation to his role in demolishing these shrines, and
additionally the door of a renowned mosque (Sidi Yahia) and adjacent build-
ings, all of which constituted conduct falling under the auspices of Article
8(2)(e)(iv) of the ICC Statute. The devotional sites he attacked have since been
rebuilt with the help of foreign financial assistance.6
The Al Mahdi case represents the first time that charges have been
brought before the ICC for the war crime of intentional attacks on
cultural property. Although such attacks are ‘in no sense a modern
2 Judgment and Sentence, Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15), Trial Chamber VIII, 27 September 2016
(hereinafter ‘Al Mahdi judgment and sentence’); see also M. Simons, ‘Prison Sentence Over
Smashing of Shrines in Timbuktu: 9 Years’, NewYork Times, 27 September 2016.
3 Reparations Order, Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15),Trial ChamberVIII, 17 August 2017 (hereinafter
‘Al Mahdi reparations order’). For further discussion, see F. Capone, ‘An Appraisal of the Al
Mahdi Order on Reparations and Its Innovative Elements: Redress for Victims of Crimes
Against Cultural Heritage’, 16 Journal of International Criminal Justice (JICJ) (2018) 645^661.
4 M. Lostal, ‘The Misplaced Emphasis on the Intangible Dimension of Cultural Heritage in the Al
Mahdi Case at the ICC’, 1 Inter Gentes (2017) 45^58, at 50 (‘Timbuktu is sometimes referred to
as the City of the 333 (Sufi) Saints ::: . It also houses thousands of sacred manuscripts, many
dating back to the 13th century ::: . Sufism, one of the many different currents within Islam, is
accused by followers of Salafism (the creed espoused by fundamentalist groups) of being
polytheist.’).
5 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 23
November 1972, 1037 UNTS 151 (entered into force 15 December 1975). For discussion of selec-
tion criteria and processes for the World Heritage List, which is established by this
Convention, see discussion infra notes 58^62.
6 Al Mahdi reparations order, supra note 3, xx 63, 116 (‘Since the attacks, UNESCO ç together
with other stakeholders ç has rebuilt or restored each of the Protected Buildings.’); see also
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/20/timbuktus-historic-tombs-restored-in-show-
of-confidence-for-war-ravaged-mali (visited 29 November 2018).
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phenomenon’,7 the deployment of international judicial institutions to pros-
ecute offenders is a recent development. To be clear, the ICC is not the first judi-
cial institution to turn to international criminal law to protect cultural
property in armed conflict. The International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) did so in the context of violence during the Balkans
Wars;8 the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg indicted major war
criminals for destruction of cultural monuments;9 and in 1947, the French
Permanent Military Tribunal found a civilian guilty of a war crime for destroy-
ing a statue of Joan of Arc and a monument commemorating the dead of
World War I.10 The reparations order in Al Mahdi, made possible by virtue of
the ICC Statute’s innovative nature, for its part presents as a breakthrough in
terms of assisting populations afflicted by cultural property destruction.11
The judgment and reparations order in Al Mahdi coincide with a moment in
which debates over cultural property have intensified in a broad array of discip-
lines and venues. In the two years since Al Mahdi’s criminal conviction, ques-
tions of protection and destruction and removal of cultural property ç and
the place of cultural heritage and memorialization in public life ç continue
to galvanize discussion and enflame heightened passions. To gesture towards
but a few such controversies: acrimonious debates over Confederate memorials
roil the United States; a statue of Canada’s first Prime Minister, Sir John A.
Macdonald, has been removed from the city hall of Victoria, British Columbia
(two other iconic/ironic place-names) owing to his establishment of cruel
anti-Aboriginal policies in the then newly independent country; legislation
has been enacted in Serbia that requires any construction of war memorials
to be ‘in line with’ the country’s ‘liberation wars’ and permits removal of me-
morials that fail to ‘correspond [to] historical or real facts’ or ‘offend state
7 M.S. Ellis, ‘The ICC’s Role in Combatting the Destruction of Cultural Heritage’, 49 CaseWestern
Reserve Journal of International Law (2017) 23^62, at 24.
8 Judgment, Jokic¤ (IT-01-42/1-S), Trial Chamber, 18 March 2004 (Jokic¤ was sentenced to seven
years’ imprisonment); Judgment, Strugar (IT-01-42-T), Trial Chamber, 31 January 2005
(Strugar was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment); S. Brammertz, K. Hughes, A. Kipp and
W. Tomljanovich, ‘Attacks Against Cultural Heritage as a Weapon of War’, 14 JICJ (2016)
1143^1174. See, however, Al Mahdi judgment and sentence, supra note 2, x 16 (noting that
ICTY jurisprudence is of ‘limited guidance’ in light of the fact that the crime in the ICTYSt.
does not govern ‘attacks’ against cultural objects but rather punishes their ‘destruction or
wilful damage’).
9 Count Three (War Crimes), Part E (Plunder of Public and Private Property, Indictment, in Trial of
the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November
1945^1 October 1946, vol. 1 at 11^30. One scholar notes that ‘[t]he [International Military
Tribunal] held that confiscation and destruction of religious and cultural institutions and objects
of Jewish communities amounted to persecution that was a crime against humanity’. See A.F.
Vrdoljak, ‘The Criminalisation of the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage’ (2016), at 14,
available online at http://works.bepress.com/ana_filipa_vrdoljak/38/ (visited 29 November 2018).
10 Trial of Karl Lingenfelder (11 March 1947), in United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law
Reports of Trials ofWar Criminals (London, 1949) Vol. 9, 67.
11 For exploration of preventative and other non-criminal law ways to protect cultural heritage
from destruction and looting, see M.V. Vlasic and H. Turku, ‘‘‘Blood Antiquities’’: Protecting
Cultural Heritage beyond Criminalization’, 14 JICJ (2016) 1175^1197.
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interests ::: or public morality’;12 the thinning out of Afrikaans language in-
struction gathers steam as a matter of educational policy at the primary, sec-
ondary, and tertiary levels throughout South Africa; ISIS’ demolition of sites
in Nimrud, Palmyra, and mausoleums north of Baghdad as well as its trade
in pilfered antiquities;13 the destruction by fire of Brazil’s most cherished but
budgetarily starved Museu Nacional in Rio de Janeiro;14 preservation of sites
and artefacts sacred to indigenous peoples;15 and exhortations for museums
to ‘return’ objects to their places of origin (from which they were often taken
by colonial or occupying powers) have increased in scale and tempo.16
This essay explores connections ç whether intentional, inchoate, subtle, ac-
cidental or inadvertent ç between the Al Mahdi case and these broader de-
bates. What might criminally punishing the destruction of cultural property
in the manner outlined by the ICC in Al Mahdi bring to or imply for these de-
bates, including questions of how to approach cultural heritage in contexts of
transitional justice that seek to incubate cultural changes? In this vein, this
essay unspools what the ICC did in Al Mahdi and reflects a bit on how the ICC
might have done things differently. That said, the heart of this essay is to ru-
minate upon the kinds of conversations ç taking place afar from The Hague
and courtrooms ç that Al Mahdi might energize, open, discourage or close.
One immediate response is that the ICC has nothing to add to such conversa-
tions: such is not its goal, nor is the institution equipped to do so. The work
product of the ICC ç arguendo ç is limited to technically pronouncing upon
the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is a response that I have heard
from some international criminal lawyers when I have presented this article
12 Balkan Transitional Justice, ‘Serbian Law Says Memorials Must Commemorate ‘LiberationWars’,
29 June 2018.
13 The United Nations Security Council, moreover, has explicitly condemned the destruction of
cultural heritage and religious sites and artefacts by terrorist groups. United Nations Security
Council Res. 2347 (24 March 2017). In May 2015, the UN General Assembly unanimously
adopted a resolution entitled ‘Saving the Cultural Heritage of Iraq’. GA Res 69/281.
14 M. Andreoni, E. London‹ o and L. Moriconi, ‘Double Blow to Brazil Museum: Neglect, Then
Flames’, NewYork Times, 3 September 2018 (reporting that ‘thousands, perhaps millions of sig-
nificant artefacts had been reduced to ashes ::: in a devastating fire’ and noting that the lack
of a fire-suppression system and infrastructure breakdowns (such as fire hydrants lacking
water and smoke detectors not working) exacerbated the damage. See also ‘Brazil museum
fire: Funding cuts blamed as icon is gutted’, BBC News, 3 September 2018 (on file with the
author)).
15 F. Holder, ‘Indigenous Rights and International Law’, Research Paper (Monash University,
School of Law) July 2018 (on file with the author); A.R. Riley, ‘Straight Stealing: Towards an
Indigenous System of Cultural Property Protection’, 80 Washington Law Review (2005) 69^164,
at 75.
16 So, too, have defensive ripostes to such claims. Italy, for example, has argued that the Aksum
Obelisk, taken from Ethiopia during the colonial era, has naturalized now as Italian. ‘Italy to
keep Ethiopian Monument’, BBC Africa, 20 July 2001, available online at http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/africa/1448531.stm (visited 3 December 2018). In France, controversies freshly churn
regarding President Macron’s pledge to return 26 objects of the Quai Branly collection to
Be¤ nin which had been looted by colonial forces in 1892. See F. Nayeri, ‘Return of African
Artifacts Sets a Tricky Precedent for Europe’s Museums’, New York Times, 27 November 2018
(noting also that the British Museum has distanced itself from this pledge).







ashington & Lee U
niversity user on 07 O
ctober 2019
in public venues.While I remain sceptical that most international criminal law-
yers actually feel this way about ‘our’ work product, in the event I am mis-
guided, it appears (to me) that the work product of international criminal
courts and tribunals, regardless of intent, nonetheless serves as a touchstone,
reference point, and barometer for diverse stakeholders and observers operat-
ing outside of the field of law.
Returning quickly to my scepticism, however: high-profile criminal trials
undertaken in the solemnity of The Hague do strike me as crowning them-
selves with considerable didactic, pedagogic, explanatory, expository, and ex-
pressive value. They regale; they circulate stories, which they authenticate
through judicial prose.17 Trials fill spaces, which they then imagine and con-
struct. Certainly, the Lubanga case was heralded as deeply instructive in terms
of contributing to narratives of child soldiering: as I have argued elsewhere, at
times in a hobbled manner owing to the emaciated concept of the child soldier
that was deployed (and deplored) by and through international criminal law.18
What about Al Mahdi? What positionality does it occupy? How does the vision
of cultural heritage actuated by the judgment and reparations order ç the
vision projected by international criminal law ç filter into these broader dis-
cursive frames? How does it chime and rhyme with debates unfolding in these
plots and pleats? Is the international legal vision a reflective one or a reflexive
one? This essay unpacks how judicial decision-makers, and the prosecutors
who teed up theAl Mahdi case, approach the questions of what constitutes cul-
tural property and why cultural property matters.
Elemental among debates within cultural property theory is whether the
protective impulse is internationalist or nationalist in motivation.19 The 1954
Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict,20 for example, reflects a cosmopolitan approach that envisions
17 Stories also are told in the places where international criminal law remains silent. Some of
these stories are confabulations, painful ‘fake news’, or just denialism. For example, in
Zvornik, in the former Yugoslavia, Serbs destroyed five mosques in the Balkans Wars. Yet, in
brazen revisionism, Zvornik’s mayor claimed that ‘there were never any mosques in Zvornik’
ç completely gas-lighting, he insists they never existed. See Prosecutor’s Opening Statement,
available online at https://www.icc-cpi.int/legalAidConsultations?name¼otp-stat-al-mahdi-
160822 (visited 29 November 2018). Other histories of cultural property destruction remain
documented but not sanctioned, such as Turkish attempts to pulverize the cultural heritage
of the Armenians.
18 M.A. Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Criminal Law and Policy (Oxford
University Press, 2012).
19 J.H. Merryman, ‘Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property’, 80 American Journal of
International Law (AJIL) (1986) 831^853. See also ibid., at 853 (contrasting retentive nationalism
with cultural internationalism; Merryman favours cultural internationalism owing to its em-
phasis on ‘preservation, integrity, and distribution/access’). For critique of Merryman’s views,
see L.V. Prott, ‘The International Movement of Cultural Objects’, 12 International Journal of
Cultural Property (2005) 225.
20 The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict
(14 May1954), 249 UNTS 240 (hereinafter ‘1954 Hague Convention’). This Convention descends
from the 1863 Lieber Code, the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, and the Washington Pact
of 1935. In Art. 1, it defines cultural property as ‘moveable or immovable property of great
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the primary significance of cultural property in that it contributes to the cul-
tural heritage of all of humanity. For the internationalist vision, the term ‘heri-
tage’ ç in particular, common heritage of humanity ç is preferred over the
term ‘property’with its connotations of material ownership and rights of exclu-
sion. The other major international instrument on cultural property is the
1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the
Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, which
deals with the different context of looting and sale.21 This instrument ties the
importance of cultural property to individual states because that property
expresses ‘the collective genius of the State concerned’.22 This instrument
thereby reflects a sense of cultural nationalism in that it attributes national
character to the property in question, seeks its retention in its place of origin
and traditional setting, and its repatriation in the case of illicit removal.23
Al Mahdi offers little in the way of mindful reference to either of these over-
arching theories. In the end, the judgment ç without assignation and with os-
cillation ç places the ICC Statute provision somewhere between these two
poles of cultural property theory: though inclining more towards the interna-
tionalist justification for protection in the case of the penal sanction and to-
wards the nationalist justification in the reparations order. The reparations
decision could in fact be read to impliedly gesture toward a third approach,
namely a ‘localist’ vision of cultural property protection in that nearly all the
ordered funds were intended for the population of Timbuktu.
2. The Proceedings and their Background(s)
Armed violence became endemic in Mali beginning in January 2012. A com-
plex situation arose. Armed groups took control of the north of the country fol-
lowing the retreat of official Malian forces. Among these armed groups were
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Ansar Dine (‘defenders of faith’).
Al Mahdi was associated with Ansar Dine. These groups sought the
importance to the cultural heritage of every people’and, in its preamble, affirms that ‘damage to
cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage
of all mankind, since each people makes its contribution to the culture of the world’.
Destruction of a culture’s property, therefore, is seen as eliminating part of the biodiversity of
humanity. This Convention requires the affixing of a ‘distinctive emblem’ (a blue and white
shield), either three times or one time depending on the level of protection or identification.
See Arts 16^17 1954 Hague Convention, ibid. Art. 28 obliges parties to criminalize breaches of
the convention. See generally, P. Gerstenblith, ‘The Destruction of Cultural Heritage: A Crime
Against Property or a Crime Against People?’ 15 John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property
Law (2016) 336^393, at 346; R. O’Keefe, ‘Protection of Cultural Property Under International
Law’, 11 Melbourne Journal of International Law (2010) 339^392 (noting that no charges have
been laid within the meaning of Art. 28).
21 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer
of Ownership of Cultural Property (14 November 1970), 823 UNTS 231.
22 Ibid., Art. 4(a).
23 Merryman, supra note 19, at 832, 846.
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establishment of an independent country, called Azawad, under the control of
Ansar Dine. Between April 2012 and January 2013, AQIM and Ansar Dine
‘imposed their religious and political edicts on the territory of Timbuktu and
its people ::: through a local government, which included an Islamic tribunal,
an Islamic police force, a media commission and a morality brigade ::: called
the Hesbah’.24 Hesbah enforced sharia and was tasked with ‘preventing, sup-
pressing and repressing anything perceived by the occupiers to constitute a
visible vice’.25
Al Mahdi (also known as Abu Turab, his nom de guerre) ç a teacher and an
ethnic Tuareg ç was born in Agoune in the region of Timbuktu and, at the
time of his trial, was believed to be between 30 and 40 years old.26 He had
received Koranic education since childhood and ‘belongs to a family recog-
nized in his community for having a particularly high knowledge of Islam’.27
Although he was the head of the Hesbah until September 2012 he also reported
to Ag Ghaly (leader of Ansar Dine) and Abou Zhed (governor of Timbuktu).
Al Mahdi had been arrested in Niger by French troops, from where he was
sent to The Hague.28 Al Mahdi reached a plea agreement with the Office of
the Prosecutor on 18 February 2016.29 His trial was held between 22 and 24
August 2016.30 In Al Mahdi, a total of eight victims participated in the trial
proceedings.31
At trial, judges noted Al Mahdi’s initial reluctance to demolish the mauso-
leums, a decision that had been made by his superiors.32 While Al Mahdi
believed that any construction over a tomb was prohibited by Islamic law, he
initially recommended ‘not destroying the mausoleums so as to maintain rela-
tions between the population and the occupying groups’.33 Nonetheless, as
time passed, he agreed to conduct the attack ‘without hesitation’ when in-
structed, prepared a sermon dedicated to the destruction of the mausoleums,
and ‘personally determined the sequence in which the buildings/monuments
were to be attacked’.34 Al Mahdi was also well aware ç for it was common
knowledge ç that mausoleums of saints and mosques of Timbuktu comprise
24 Al Mahdi judgment and sentence, supra note 2, x 31. For a poignant, painful, and utterly digni-
fied cinematographic treatment of life in Mali under Ansar Dine in 2012, see Timbuktu (2014),
a Franco-Mauritanian drama feature film directed byAbderrahmane Sissako.
25 Al Mahdi judgment and sentence, supra note 2, x 33.
26 Al Mahdi judgment and sentence, supra note 2, x 9.
27 Ibid.
28 A single ICC judge issued his arrest warrant on 18 September 2015. Al Mahdi judgment and
sentence, supra note 2, x1.
29 Al Mahdi judgment and sentence, supra note 2, x 3.
30 Al Mahdi judgment and sentence, supra note 2, x7.
31 Al Mahdi judgment and sentence, supra note 2, x6.
32 For the argument that it remains unclear whether Al Mahdi is the ‘most responsible’ for the
crimes, see M. Sterio, ‘Individual Criminal Responsibility for the Destruction of Religious and
Historic Buildings: The Al Mahdi Case’, 49 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law
(2017) 63^73.
33 Al Mahdi judgment and sentence, supra note 2, x 36.
34 Al Mahdi judgment and sentence, supra note 2, x 37.







ashington & Lee U
niversity user on 07 O
ctober 2019
‘an integral part of the religious life of its inhabitants’, are frequently visited,
serve as places of pilgrimage, and ‘constitute a common heritage for the
community’.35
The sites were razed publicly and with great force. Security cordons pro-
tected the attackers. The door of the Sidi Yahia Mosque was ‘opened’ with pick-
axes that Al Mahdi had bought with Hesbah funds.36 According to legend,
that door had not been opened for 500 years. It guarded against the ‘evil
eye’.37 Opening it would lead to the Last Judgment. Deriding these legends as
‘superstitions’, Al Mahdi explained to journalists that destruction of the doors
was one way to eradicate idolatry and heresy, while also dispelling myths
which Hesbah ‘fear[ed] will invade the beliefs of people ::: who, because of
their ignorance and their distance from religion, will think that this is the
truth’.38
The three trial judges determined based on the admission of guilt and related
facts that Al Mahdi: supervised the execution of the operations; collected,
bought and distributed the necessary tools; was present at all of the attack
sites where he gave instructions and moral support; was responsible for justify-
ing the attacks to journalists; and personally participated in the destruction of
at least five sites.39 Judges noted that nine of the sites were designated by
UNESCO as important to international cultural heritage. Although these desig-
nations are supposed to protect cultural property, in the case of the Timbuktu
shrines these designations may paradoxically have imperilled them. Al Mahdi,
for instance, directly invoked the UNESCO protections as a reason to wreck
one mosque: ‘Those UNESCO jackasses::: they think that this is heritage. Does
‘‘heritage’’ include worshipping cows and trees?, he said.’40
Regarding the gravity of Al Mahdi’s crime, a central calculus in sentencing,
the Trial Chamber observed that he is unlike other accused the ICC has con-
victed in that he was never charged with crimes against persons.41 Although
the judges noted that crimes against property ‘are generally of lesser gravity
than crimes against persons,’42 they also underscored the symbolic value, reli-
gious salience, and affective attachment generated by the Timbuktu shrines.43
They were quite responsive to Prosecutor Bensouda’s argument, delivered ini-
tially in the confirmation of charges hearing, that ‘[w]hat is at stake here is
not just walls and stones’.44 Judges hovered around the UNESCO designation:
attacking such designated sites was found to be of particular gravity. On this
note, perhaps, the judges not only valued UNESCO assessments as to what
35 Al Mahdi judgment and sentence, supra note 2, x 34.
36 Al Mahdi judgment and sentence, supra note 2, x 38(viii).
37 Lostal, supra note 4, at 49.
38 Al Mahdi judgment and sentence, supra note 2, x 38(viii).
39 Al Mahdi judgment and sentence, supra note 2, x 40.
40 Al Mahdi judgment and sentence, supra note 2, x 46.
41 Al Mahdi judgment and sentence, supra note 2, x77.
42 Al Mahdi judgment and sentence, supra note 2, x77.
43 Al Mahdi judgment and sentence, supra note 2, x78.
44 ICC, Al Mahdi Transcript of the Confirmation of Charges Hearing, 1 March 2016, at 13.
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kind of culture is worth protecting, but also saw Al Mahdi’s attacks as aimed
against the international community and its organizations. The judges toggled
back to the national, however, underscoring that ‘the population of Mali, who
considered Timbuktu as a source of pride, were indignant to see these acts
take place’.45 The Trial Chamber also separately identified Al Mahdi’s ‘discrim-
inatory religious motive’ as additional evidence of the gravity of the impugned
conduct.46
In terms of the second step of sentencing, the individualization stage, judges
found no aggravating circumstances. However, they acknowledged five mitigat-
ing factors: admission of guilt; cooperation with prosecutors; demonstration
of remorse and empathy; Al Mahdi’s initial reluctance to carry out the destruc-
tion and the fact that he stopped the use of bulldozers at all but one of the
shrines which thereby limited overall damage; and his good behaviour in de-
tention.47 Al Mahdi had (after the fact) issued a formal statement that ‘begged’
the people of Timbuktu for forgiveness and that affirmed that he had lost his
way when he had joined the jihadist group.48
The reparations order ç issued approximately one year later ç found Al
Mahdi liable for 2.7 million euros in expenses for individual and collective rep-
arations for: (i) the damage caused by the attack on nine mosques and the
Sidi Yahia Mosque door; (ii) the economic loss caused to the individuals
whose livelihoods depended upon the tourism and maintenance of these pro-
tected buildings and to the community of Timbuktu as a whole; and (iii) the
moral harm caused by the attacks.49 The Trial Chamber identified three sets
of ‘victims’: the inhabitants of Timbuktu (the direct victims of the crime), the
population of Mali, and the international community. The reparations order
echoed some of the themes pertinent to assessing the value of cultural property
that had suffused the criminal conviction. That said, when it comes to tensions
between internationalist justifications for protecting cultural property, on the
one hand, and nationalist ones, on the other, the reparations order ç while at
times underscoring the value of international ‘interest’as a proxy for value50 ç
also allocated considerable salience to nationalist approaches. Interestingly, this
order even transcends national approaches by referencing the reparative rights
45 Al Mahdi judgment and sentence, supra note 2, x80. The Trial Chamber relied on the testimony
of two witnesses (a Malian expert in cultural matters and a UNESCO witness). See U.S.
Bishop-Burney, ‘International Decisions: Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi’, 111 AJIL
(2017) 126^132, at 131.
46 Al Mahdi judgment and sentence, supra note 2, x 81.
47 Al Mahdi judgment and sentence, supra note 2, x109.
48 Simons, supra note 2. At trial, Al Mahdi stated: ‘I am really sorry. I am really remorseful and I
regret all the damage that my actions have caused.’ Ellis, supra note 7, at 29.
49 Al Mahdi is impecunious. So the Trust Fund for Victims could step in.
50 Al Mahdi reparations order, supra note 3, x17 (‘Greater interest vested in an object by the inter-
national community reflects a higher cultural significance and a higher degree of international
attention and concern.’).







ashington & Lee U
niversity user on 07 O
ctober 2019
of local communities and populations.51 The people of Timbuktu are able to as-
sert reparative rights in the destruction of ‘their’ cultural property and ‘their’
cultural heritage and received nearly all the reparations for damage to pro-
tected buildings, consequential economic loss and moral harm. The
Malian state received one symbolic euro. The Trial Chamber also granted ‘one
symbolic euro ::: to the international community, which is best represented by
UNESCO’.52
3. Civilian Property and Cultural Property
Article 8(2)(e)(iv) ICC Statute prohibits as a war crime in non-international
armed conflict intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to re-
ligion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hos-
pitals or places where the sick and wounded are collected which are not
military objectives. A similar prohibition applies to international armed con-
flict. Although ‘culture’ is not expressly mentioned in the definition of the
crime, Al Mahdi was prosecuted for conduct prosecutors and ICC judges char-
acterized as attacks upon religious and historical buildings and broadly cast
as targeting ‘cultural property’,53 a phrase that the 1954 Hague Convention ex-
pressly invokes. It is nonetheless somewhat vexing, from a legalist perspective,
that the term ‘cultural’ entered the lexicon of the ICC proceedings even though
it absents itself from the actual language of the prohibited crime in the ICC
Statute. On the other hand, the use of the term ‘cultural property’as shorthand
for the objects of the attack reveals the heart of the proceedings which
Prosecutor Bensouda made apparent in her opening statement with her some-
what trite invocation that ‘culture is who we are’.
The Trial Chamber explicitly (and approvingly) noted the Prosecutor’s deci-
sion not to charge Al Mahdi with the general crime, also proscribed by the
ICC Statute, of attacking civilian property.54 On this note, judges differentiated
the protection of cultural objects from generic protections offered to civilian
objects (including pillage). That said, they failed to engage the far deeper ques-
tion as to why cultural property actually requires differentiated protection.
Legal scholar Eric Posner approaches this question from a law and eco-
nomics perspective. Posner floats the idea that cultural property ought to be
treated like regular property and, hence, as meriting whatever protection the
unregulated market will offer.55 While Posner himself recognizes that it may
seem ‘silly’ to question what is ‘special’ about cultural property, he makes a
51 Al Mahdi reparations order, supra note 3, x 14 (‘[C]ultural heritage plays a central role in the
way communities define themselves and bond together, and how they identify with their past
and contemplate their future.’).
52 Al Mahdi reparations order, supra note 3, x107.
53 Al Mahdi judgment and sentence, supra note 2, x14.
54 Al Mahdi judgment and sentence, supra note 2, x12.
55 E.A. Posner, ‘The International Protection of Cultural Property: Some Skeptical Observations’
(University of Chicago Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 141, 2006), available
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non-trivial case that it may be no less silly to rely on markets to protect such
property than on states or international organizations neither of which, in his
view, necessarily ‘have a strong moral right to the cultural property created
by predecessor populations’.56 In terms of reparations, the Trial Chamber’s ref-
erence to the economic loss triggered by declining tourism instantiates a view
rooted in economic gain which notably is a metric that would be used to
value ordinary common property, thereby casting some support on Posner’s
view that cultural property and ordinary property may not be as different as
may seem at first blush.
4. Property and People: Devotional Use and UNESCO’s
Lists
The Al Mahdi judgment (notably on the matter of sentencing) and reparations
order measured the gravity of the harm from the perspective of how much that
property meant to people in real-time. Judges began with the premise that
crimes against persons were more ‘serious’ than crimes against objects and
things. Hence, when it came to the gravity of the attacks in Timbuktu, judges
emphasized now these attacks affected human beings and triggered suffering in
the lives they live. The Trial Chamber thereby adopted a somewhat anthropocen-
tric model of culture and loss. It measured the value of heritage in a relational
sense and not in an intrinsic sense. On the one hand, this move seems natural,
self-evident and textually faithful to the language of the ICC Statute and
approaches to gravity that are commonplace within criminal law. On the other
hand, this move also belies far thicker and richer questions as to how to value cul-
tural property and what exactly to protect. The inclusion of international penal
sanction within the framework of conversations about cultural property thereby
animates wider discursive spaces in ways that both enliven and enfeeble.
In Al Mahdi, the human ‘value’of the shrines could be established with rela-
tive ease through the deployment of proxies. Nearly all of the shrines were pro-
tected by UNESCO as heritage sites (inscribed on the World Heritage List). The
UNESCO designations weighed heavily in the minds of the judges (and in the
Prosecutor’s arguments).57 Within the umbrella of UNESCO, the World
Heritage Committee has the final say on whether a property is inscribed on
online at https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article¼1315&con-
text¼public_law_and_legal_theory (visited 3 November 2018).
56 Ibid., at 16.
57 Al Mahdi judgment and sentence, supra note 2, x 46. The fourth sentence of the Prosecutor’s
Opening Statement begins: ‘They were a major part of the historic heritage of this ancient
city. They were also more generally a part of the heritage of Mali, of Africa and of the world.
All, except one, were inscribed on theWorld Heritage List.’ In ICTY proceedings for destruction
or wilful damage of cultural property (rather than attacks), individuals were charged with
and convicted for the destruction of the old town of Dubrovnik, also listed as a UNESCO
World Heritage Site, and charged with but ultimately acquitted regarding the Stari Most
bridge (as civilian property), which became formally listed with UNESCO in 2005 but had
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theWorld Heritage List. This Committee meets once a year. It consists of repre-
sentatives from 21 of the States Parties to the Convention Concerning the
Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage.58 Pursuant to Article
11(1) of this Convention, the Committee shall establish, keep up to date and
publish this list of properties forming part of the cultural heritage and natural
heritage which it considers as having outstanding universal value in terms of
such criteria as it shall have established. Outstanding universal value means
cultural and/or natural significance which is so exceptional as to transcend
national boundaries and to be of common importance for present and future
generations of all humanity.59
In many quarters, however, the UNESCO listing process ‘has been viewed as
notoriously politicized and biased towards particular forms of heritage’.60 On
this note, one observer has called for the ‘identification of objective criteria in-
dependent of UNESCO designation’.61 UNESCO has nonetheless (albeit under-
standably) been energized by the Al Mahdi judgment. On 6 November 2017, its
Director-General, Irina Bokova, signed ç to considerable fanfare ç a letter of
intent with Chief Prosecutor Bensouda to continue to collaborate including
on a new policy initiative on cultural heritage.62 The impact of UNESCO deter-
minations therefore seems to be on the rise. If UNESCO expert designations
now are key elements of gravity in the application of international criminal
law, perhaps the process by which UNESCO ‘experting’ is developed should
become split open or spruced up.
Also, central to the Al Mahdi case is that nearly all of the destroyed sites also
had been routinely used by the residents of Timbuktu for religious purposes.63
But what if the property was no longer being used? What if it served no religious
or worship purpose? What if the property was ugly, unappreciated, ignored,
dusty, dismal, and forlorn? Privately owned? What if a local population declared
by democratic vote to reject the property as ‘cultural’ in nature? Ironically, the
more that cultural property is loved and used the higher the likelihood that it
would be rebuilt. The gravest harms, after all, tend to befall the unloved and un-
appreciated and unkempt.While observers may quibble about whether cultural
been listed as a‘UN World Heritage Site’at the time of the attacks. Bishop-Burney, supra note 45,
at 130.
58 See supra note 5. The 21 states on the World Heritage Committee at the time of writing are:
Angola, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China,
Cuba, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Norway, Saint Kitts and Nevis,
Spain,Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania and Zimbabwe.
59 See https://whc.unesco.org/en/guidelines/,Guideline49 (all of which also provide details on
procedures).
60 S. Starrenburg, ‘Who is the victim of cultural heritage destruction? The Reparations Order in
the case of the Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi’, EJIL: Talk! Blog of the European
Journal of International Law, 25 August 2017 (on file with the author).
61 Bishop-Burney, supra note 45, at 132.
62 ‘International Criminal Court and UNESCO Strengthen Cooperation on the Protection of
Cultural Heritage’, Press Release, 6 November 2017 (on file with the author).
63 Interestingly, the emphasis on religion was less singular in the 1954 Hague Convention (supra
note 20), Art. 1(a) of which explicitly protected property ‘whether religious or secular’.
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property ever can be truly rebuilt,64 the fact remains that property that is mar-
ginal is more likely not to be rebuilt and therefore may simply disappear. The
question of a community’s democratic input in ‘its’ cultural property is an intri-
guing one. Communities may decide to cease registering something as protected
cultural property. Obversely, communities may decide to protect something
through cultural property designations precisely because they may perceive it
as being threatened. The Dutch, for example, have officially placed the
‘Sinterklaas Festival and Black Pete’ on the National Inventory of Intangible
Cultural Heritage.65 Lixinski notes that ‘Black Pete’ (Zwarte Piet) is a ‘Christmas
tradition which includes a ‘‘helper’’ of Santa Claus as a black-face or just black
person, who was once historically Santa Claus’African slave’.66
What if the property can be digitized and hologrammed and be ‘enjoyed’ that
way, thereby permitting ‘use’ in the absence of the actual tangible object?67
Would the destruction of property that has been digitized, or is capable of digi-
tal replication, be less ‘grave’ than the destruction of property fundamentally
incapable of replication and, hence, which would fade out of the ecosystem of
cultural heritage available for public enjoyment?
What about cultural property from a culture that no longer exists? Or a cul-
ture that moved away, leaving its property behind? Marina Lostal ties these
questions to theAl Mahdi judgment’s reasoning, which she chides as anthropo-
centric. Lostal specifically identifies as an example the destruction of the
Bamiyan Buddhas by the Taliban in 2001. The Bamiyan Buddhas were two
enormous statues built around the fifth century in a valley in what is now
Afghanistan. The statues oversaw a community of Buddhist monasteries.
Roughly 1500 years later, the Taliban (who controlled Afghanistan) decreed
these statues as the product of an infidel religion and dynamited them. The
Bamiyan Buddhas, unlike the mausoleums in Timbuktu, were not used by
local populations in religious practices ç ‘there are no records indicating the
presence of Buddhism in Afghanistan after 1336’.68 Hence, according to
Lostal, ‘their destruction could not affect the social practices and structures or
the cultural roots of the local people’.69 She adds: ‘It would lack what the Chief
Prosecutor has pointed to as the common denominator of all crimes detailed
by the ICC Statute ç that is that ‘‘[t]hey inflict irreparable damage to the
human persons [sic] in his or her body, mind, soul and identity’’’.70 Palmyra in
64 Prosecutor Bensouda, in her opening statement in Al Mahdi, submitted that: ‘Once destroyed,
as noted by the UN International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the restoration
of cultural heritage never brings back its inherent value.’ See online at https://www.icc-cpi.
int/legalAidConsultations?name¼otp-stat-al-mahdi-160822 (visited 3 November 2018).
65 L. Lixinski, ‘Confederate Monuments and International Law’, 35 Wisconsin International Law
Journal (2018) 549^608, at 578.
66 Ibid.
67 See generally, S.K. Katyal, ‘Technoheritage’, 105 California Law Review (2017) 1111^1172 (dis-
cussing the preservation and replication of antiquities in an age of sophisticated digital technol-
ogies and the prospect of ‘museums without walls’).
68 Lostal, supra note 4, at 56.
69 Ibid., at 56^57.
70 Ibid., at 57 (citation omitted).
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Syria constitutes a similar example.71 So, too, does the ancient city of Sabratha:
once a ‘jewel of the Roman empire,’ currently pockmarked with mortar and
small arms fire from armed conflict in Libya and which is now ‘used’ (in real-
time) as a chaotic camp of departure for refugees ç chased by smugglers and
militias ç fleeing across the Mediterranean.72
Lostal’s concern is that anthropocentrism may limit the reach of the criminal
law. My concern is broader, namely, that the anthropocentrism required by
criminal law may limit the imaginary of which property is protected (or under-
stood) as cultural. The fixation on the relational value of heritage to humans
may further weaken claims, in a broad variety of venues, to the intrinsic
value of heritage. How instead to recognize relational value without submer-
ging or squeezing out intrinsic value?
5. Silences
A cognate question not clarified byAl Mahdi is whether the protection of cul-
tural property as proscribed byArticle 8(2)(e)(iv) (or its analog in international
armed conflict) extends only to the built structures or also covers the contents
within those structures.Yaron Gottlieb, for example, has argued that the provi-
sion omits the contents of protected buildings and immovable structures,
which means that protection for such contents would have to be found outside
the cultural property provisions of the ICC Statute.73 On this note, the 1954
Hague Convention identifies cultural property as both ‘moveable’and ‘immove-
able’, thereby covering buildings and sites as well as works of art and litera-
ture.74 The ICC Statute provision thereby somewhat shrinks the reach of the
criminal law. More elementally: must the property be built? What if it was not
‘made’ by human hands (for example, geographic formations, such as Uluru in
Australia)?
Owing to the nature of the plea bargain, Al Mahdi never alleged that what
he did was justified by any military objective. This justification for intentionally
attacking cultural property, which in various forms weaves its way through a
number of proscribed war crimes, thereby remains unmapped. The 1954
71 See e.g. H. Turku, ‘When Cultural Property Becomes a Tool of Warfare: Law, Politics, and
International Security’, 1 Inter Gentes (2017) 3^23, at 16 (‘Questions can be raised as to whether
the pre-Islamic Roman Era ruins of Palmyra or the Assyrian city of Nimrud have anything in
common with the predominantly Arab population that inhabits the region today. Or do these
historical sites partly represent the heritage of some people who lived there once in the
past?’). ISIS also has targeted the ancient city of Dura Europos, located on the banks of the
Euphrates river near the Syrian and Iraqi border.
72 ‘‘‘Jewel of Roman Empire’’ faces Libya dangers’, France 24, 3 October 2018 (document on file
with the author).
73 Y. Gottlieb, ‘Criminalizing Destruction of Cultural Property: A Proposal for Defining New
Crimes Under the Rome Statute of the ICC’, 23 Penn State International Law Review (2005)
857^896.
74 Art. 1(a) 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 20.
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Hague Convention for its part permitted a waiver of the obligations thereunder
‘only in case where military necessity imperatively requires such a waiver’.75
In theAl Mahdi case, it is rather unlikely that the facts would have supported
a finding that the protective obligation would cede to the exigencies of warfare.
In lengthy proceedings involving the destruction of the old bridge at Mostar
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, the ICTYdid find the existence of military ne-
cessity. This bridge (‘Stari Most’) was designed by preeminent Ottoman archi-
tect Sinan and completed in 1566.76 It spanned the Neretva River and linked
the ethnically and religiously diverse neighborhoods of Mostar before the
start of the Balkans Wars. Croatian forces flattened the bridge on 9 November
1993. Six commanders were indicted on many charges, including destruction
of mosques, religious properties and the Stari Most.77 These defendants
argued that Stari Most played a vital role in supporting Bosnian Muslim
forces in that it enabled them to cross the river and transport supplies and
troops. Hence, they submitted that they were justified in shelling it. The ICTY
had to grapple with questions of military necessity, cultural property and civil-
ian property. An ICTY Trial Chamber came up with a convoluted verdict on
the Stari Most charges. It ruled not on the basis of the bridge as cultural prop-
erty but instead on the basis that it was civilian property that had been wan-
tonly destroyed, although it underscored that the destruction also had a very
serious psychological impact on the Muslim population of Mostar.78 This Trial
Chamber however had also found that the bridge was a military target. Still,
it entered convictions for the destruction of the bridge. In November 2017, the
ICTY Appeals Chamber reversed the conviction finding that the Trial
Chamber had erred in that it had not established that the destruction of the
bridge was not justified by military necessity. The Appeals Chamber held that
the Trial Chamber’s finding that the destruction of the bridge offered a definite
military advantage precluded the finding that the destruction of the bridge
was not necessary and, hence, justifiable.79
Yet another silence: in reaching its decision as to sentence theTrial Chamber
did not turn to national law. Judges did not cull general principles of law as evi-
denced in a cross-section of national legal systems; nor did they review the
practices of national courts in whatever cultural property destruction cases na-
tional institutions may have adjudicated. The Trial Chamber did not invoke
75 Art. 4(2) 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 20. For discussion of the differentiation between
imperative military necessity and military objective (the ICCSt. standard) see Gerstenblith,
supra note 20, at 379. In other war crimes prohibitions in the ICC Statute, the operative lan-
guage is ‘direct overall military advantage anticipated’.
76 Gerstenblith, supra note 20, at 371.
77 One of these defendants was Slobodan Praljak, who committed suicide in the courtroom in late
2017 when the appeals judgment was announced.
78 See also discussion supra notes 53 to 56 on civilian property and cultural property.
79 In regard to the destruction by Croatian armed forces of 10 mosques in East Mostar as well as
Muslim property in Prozor municipality, the Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber’s
neglect to enter convictions for such destruction as a violation of the laws or customs of war
was an error. It then declined however to enter new convictions on appeal. See also generally,
Brammertz, Hughes, Kipp, and Tomljanovich, supra note 8.
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processes of valuation that national authorities and legislatures may have de-
ployed when it comes, for example, to questions of recompense including for
the devastation of indigenous cultural property.80
6. Bellwethers and Harbingers
Intentionally attacking cultural property may constitute an initial step in what
can mutate into something far more endemic. These attacks may be a trigger
to dehumanize, demoralize and depict the persecuted victim group as lacking
culture and thereby as unworthy. These attacks may form part of the early
stages of genocide. In this regard, noting and condemning the obliteration of
cultural property can be a canary in a coalmine, so to speak, of something in-
choate that portends to become even more wide-spread.
Culturally destructive conduct in Mali nonetheless triggers vexing questions
regarding the re-definition of culture from within the group by members who
wish to reconstitute cultural content.81 That said, the international legal
regime largely was conceptualized to protect cultural property from attack by
others outside the state or group. In Al Mahdi, the trashing of idolatrous and
heretical Sufi monuments by followers of Salafism straddles an interstitial pos-
ition. On the one hand, this violence could be constructed as a form of group-
based opposition and dominance. In addition to Mali, after all, Sufi shrines
have been damaged in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Syria.82 On the other hand,
the violence remains within the overarching group and is deployed to articu-
late the ‘proper’ way in which to observe and commemorate the group’s puta-
tive religious practices.
And what about cultural changes provoked from without? Al Mahdi matters
here, as well, since it limits destruction as change agent. Let us take the Hagia
Sofia in Istanbul, which has grown somewhat by bricolage through multiple reli-
gious faiths. Is the evolution of the Hagia Sofia the proper way to ‘revise’cultural
property? Who, then, may assert rights to cultural property enforcement or rep-
arations in such contexts ç what culture does the Hagia Sofia represent?
7. Rights to Cultural Property?
Al Mahdi operationalizes the principle that it is a crime to attack cultural
property during armed conflict and that designated victims should receive
80 In the USA, see e.g. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. xx 305,
3001^3013 (2000). See also generally, Protect and Preserve Cultural Property Act, 130 Stat.
369 (2016) (implementing United Nations Security Council Resolution 2199).
81 In this regard, Al Mahdi could perhaps assist in the conceptualization of violence by the Khmer
Rouge regime which sought inter alia to redefine an entire nationality. The Khmer Rouge
engaged in widespread desecration of Buddhist temples and shrines, mosques, and Catholic
churches. Gerstenblith, supra note 20, at 378.
82 Ibid., at 356.
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reparations for having suffered such criminal conduct. The work of the ICC
in Al Mahdi thereby highlights the seriousness of this kind of violence and
deepens the collective condemnation thereof ç thereby signalling how the
repudiation of such conduct is gaining strength. A next conceptual step,
then, is to enquire whether the protection of cultural property during
armed conflict gives rights to individuals who enjoy the use of cultural
property to require their governments to update, maintain and preserve
that property. Does a state have the duty to fight to protect its cultural prop-
erty from intentional attacks by others?83 If so, why should that duty on
the state to protect cultural property cease in peace-time?84 Might this
mean that states have an ongoing duty to maintain and upkeep such prop-
erty? Would letting it fall into disrepair be tantamount to a breach of a pro-
tective duty? If UNESCO or another entity determines property within the
national borders of a state to constitute internationally protected cultural
property or cultural heritage, then, does this pre-determine how a state
may treat it? If so, arguments could arise that one way to mitigate these
harms arising from negligence, lack of capacity or disinterest is for that cul-
tural property to migrate to places where it can be properly maintained
and adoptively loved: the British Museum, for example, the Met, or
the Louvre. What impact would the legal requirements to protect cultural
property ç and rights to be claimed (by all of humanity even?) thereupon
ç have upon debates over preservation and colonialism. These debates im-
plicate knotty questions, for example, about where King Tut’s mask
should sit (after all, his beard was broken off in the Cairo Museum and
stuck back on with Crazy Glue) and where the Elgin/Parthenon Marbles
should stand. In Lebanon, hundreds of artefacts were looted and destroyed
by militias during the country’s civil war that raged from 1975 to 1991.
Many of these artefacts date to the Phoenicians. Decades later, some arte-
facts have returned to Lebanon.85 Others ç wildly damaged such that they
look deranged ç quietly remain on display in Beirut’s National Museum.
A placard in their cabinet informs visitors that ‘[t]he terrible condition of
these objects as well as the fusion of metal, ivory, glass and stone are the
result of high temperatures reached during a fire caused by the shelling of
a storage area’ in the museum.
83 The 1954 Hague Convention permits and regulates the transport and transfer of cultural prop-
erty from one jurisdiction to another for purposes of safeguarding in times of armed conflict.
See Arts 12^14 1954 Hague Convention.
84 The 1954 Hague Convention, while focused on targeting, theft, misappropriation or destruction
of cultural property during war-time, also gestures towards preparatory measures in times of
peace for parties to safeguard cultural property within their territories.
85 See e.g. ‘Lebanon battles to get its treasures back’, 28 November 2017 (on file with the author).
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Photograph taken by the author, Beirut, National Museum, 10 March 2018
In the end, if the state has an international obligation to protect its cultural
property, then a ‘protect or expatriate’ scenario (riffing off a ‘prosecute or extra-
dite’ obligation in transnational criminal law) might arise. Cultural property
could thereby become relocated for purposes of ‘safeguarding,’ which is all the
more imperative, so goes the argument, since this property has become the
heritage of all of humanity. The Al Mahdi judgment and reparations order
might serve (ironically, inadvertently, unintentionally or purposefully) as a
touchstone to embolden such arguments.
In this regard, injection of the ethos of the Al Mahdi case into the context of
the practices of museums might stand at odds with current trends towards
the identification and restitution of artefacts ‘taken’ in the colonial era. The
German Museums Association, for example, has developed such guidelines.86
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The Royal Museum for Central Africa (AfricaMuseum), located in Tervuren on
the outskirts of Brussels, stands as a temple to the theft, pillage, and brutality
of Belgian King Leopold II in the Congo. This museum has recently renovated
its physical plant (between 2013 and 2018) as well as refurbished broad
swaths of its mission. Recognizing that ‘[f]or more than 60 years [the
museum] spread a colonial message’, it notes that its ‘current role is about in-
forming and raising awareness’.87 The museum renovation was motivated by a
desire ‘to present a contemporary and decolonised vision of Africa in a building
which had been designed as a colonial museum’.88 The official website con-
tritely discusses the pieces that have been returned to the National Museums
Institute in Kinshasa and the National Museum of Rwanda in Butare. The web-
site, moreover, also goes out of its way to affirm that the AfricaMuseum ‘has
never had stuffed humans in its collections’.
8. Whither Transitional Justice?
To be clear, lex lata the war crime of intentionally attacking cultural property
only applies in times of armed conflict. However, neither the logic of why this
war crime exists nor why Al Mahdi was prosecuted for it is conceptually lim-
ited only to situations of armed conflict. A number of observers indeed have
advocated for intentional attacks on of cultural property also to constitute a
crime against humanity, which could therefore encompass conduct outside of
armed conflict.89 And, what is more, roots of cultural property demolition run
deep in the language of genocide. Raphael Lemkin opined as such when he
coined the term genocide in1944 into which he folded the idea of the targeting
of a group’s cultural existence as among offenses against the law of nations.
Even earlier on, Lemkin had identified the crimes of ‘barbarism’ and ‘vandal-
ism’ as acts that ought to be proscribed. Barbarism he saw as persecution of
ethnic, racial, religious or social groups. In his 1933 publication ‘Acts of
Vandalism’, Lemkin wrote:
An attack targeting a collectivity can also take the form of systematic and organized de-
struction of the art and cultural heritage in which the unique genius and achievement of
86 German Museums Association, ‘Guidelines on Dealing with Collections from Colonial Contexts’
(2018).
87 The museum website notes that its original building was ‘constructed with the personal for-
tune of Leopold II. This fortune was mainly constituted as a result of the capitalist manage-
ment of the Congo Free State, which was marked by violence and abusive exploitation.’ See
online at http://www.africamuseum.be/en/discover/myths_taboos (visited 3 October 2018).
88 See online at http://www.africamuseum.be/en/discover/renovation (visited 3 October 2018).
89 See e.g. Gerstenblith, supra note 20, at 390; see also UNESCO Declaration concerning the
Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage, 17 October 2003 (noting that destruction can
take place during peace-time and extending the protections afforded to cultural heritage in
war-time to peace-time as a crime against humanity; noting also that destruction can be com-
mitted by a governing authority within its own territory; and also attributing state responsibil-
ity for such destruction).
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a collectivity are revealed in fields of science, arts and literature.] [T]he destruction of a
work of art of any nation must be regarded as acts of vandalism directed against world
culture.90
The pressures of international negotiation ç as well as Lemkin’s obsession
with the adoption and ratification of an international convention ç led to a
narrower definition of genocide than he had initially contemplated such that
notions of ‘cultural genocide’, contemplated in drafts, evaporated from the
final legal text.91
One of the main principles of international human rights law is that every
person is entitled to a minimum standard of protection. It does not matter
how cruel, hurtful, lovely, kind, appealing or misanthropic that person is.
Everyone is protected. Limitations on an individual’s freedom can be established
(e.g. through incarceration), but cannot fall below a certain floor. Individuals
cannot be destroyed or demolished. International human rights law avoids sub-
jective assessment about the value of human life by simply saying objectively
that all human life has value. Now, it is true that in practice some people are
‘more’ equal than others. Application of the law is uneven. But in a declaratory
sense, at least, international human rights posit universality.
What if the law of cultural property borrowed this core declaratory maxim
from international human rights law? This seems sensible, in that the current
Special Rapporteur on Cultural Rights for the United Nations Council on
Human Rights, Karima Bennoune, conceptualizes the intentional destruction
of cultural heritage as a human rights violation.92 Should every culture,
whether contemporary or historical, be entitled to a basic common floor of pro-
tection? In such a frame, statues and symbols and art related to settler colonial-
ism could become protected as cultural property. So, too, could Confederate
monuments in the USA: there are ‘at least 1,500’ of them ‘spread across 31
states’.93 Indeed, groups concerned with the retention and preservation in
public spaces of Confederate memorials have an interest in the Al Mahdi case
and might urge its interpellation as a touchstone into ongoing debates.
Confederate statues have become places of resistance and contestation and re-
flection in American public life. They have also become sites of tragedy, leading
in one instance to the murder of a young woman in Charlottesville, Virginia,
90 R. Lemkin, Acts Constituting a General (Transnational) Danger Considered as Offenses Against the
Law of Nations (Madrid, 1933).
91 See generally, A. Weiss-Wendt, The Soviet Union and the Gutting of the UN Genocide Convention
(University of Wisconsin Press, 2017). The Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly
omitted the term ‘cultural genocide’ from the final text. Helga Turku notes that the Danish rep-
resentative had remarked that it was ‘disproportionate and illogical to include ‘‘in the same con-
vention both mass murders in gas chambers and the closing of libraries’’’. Turku, supra note
71, at 18 (citation omitted).
92 Lostal, supra note 4, at 51. See also Gerstenblith, supra note 20, at 389; see also incidentally the
separate opinion of Judge Canc ado Trindade of the International Court of Justice in Cambodia
v. Thailand, a dispute which concerned the Temple of Preah Vihear, in which he emphasized
the human right to cultural and spiritual heritage as part of customary international law.
Cambodia v. Thailand (11 November 2013) at x 33, Request for Interpretation.
93 Lixinski, supra note 65, at 556.
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at a political rally.94 The trend is for these statues to come down and for streets
and buildings to cede their names, though several state legislatures also have
passed legislation prohibiting the removal or alteration of Confederate monu-
ments.95 The top commander of the Confederate forces, General Robert E. Lee,
is now off the pedestal in a traffic circle in New Orleans ç removed surgically
by a huge crane and subsequently crated and carted away. In other contexts ç
for example, Stone Mountain, a massive rock sculpture just east of Atlanta that
features Robert E. Lee, Confederate President Jefferson Davis, and Confederate
General Thomas ‘Stonewall’ Jackson ç actual removal might require blowing
the carvings off with explosives.96 The law school at which I teach came into ex-
istence when that same Lee served as President of the college after the Civil
War. Subsequently, his name joined the pre-existing name of Washington
College to form what is now Washington and Lee University. Questions of
memory and naming prompted a wonderfully thoughtful report from a faculty-
led Commission on Institutional History and Community in 2018.97
Some Confederate statues have been discretely removed; many others
remain; and some are toppled ç with alacrity ç by protestors. This lat-
ter fate befell ‘Silent Sam’, a bronze on the campus of the University of
North Carolina’s flagship campus located in Chapel Hill. Silent Sam was not
a replica of anyone specific or in particular. He was a generic soldier. He
stood from 1913 to 2018. Silent Sam had been proposed by the United
Daughters of the Confederacy to commemorate the students and faculty of
that university who had fought and died ‘for the South’.98 Over 1000 stu-
dents, faculty, and employees had enlisted with either the Union or (mostly)
Confederate army ç 287 lost their lives.99 Silent Sam carried a little satchel with
the letters C.S.A. on it, signalling his allegiance. At Silent Sam’s unveiling on 2
June 1913, presentations were made: some speakers noted the sacrifice of the stu-
dents while others ragingly espoused white supremacy. Beginning the in the
1960s, Silent Sam triggered consternation and anger. Calls to remove him grew. He
was frequently defaced. On 20 August 2018, Silent Sam was finally felled by a
94 See online at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/13/us/charlottesville-rally-protest-statue.html
(visited 12 December 2018).
95 In North Carolina, for example, the General Assembly passed SL 2015-170 (Cultural History
Artefact Management and Patriotism Act of 2015). This Act provides that ‘An object of remem-
brance located on public property may not be permanently removed’, though it may be ‘relo-
cated to a site of similar prominence, honor, visibility, availability, and access ::: within the
boundaries of the jurisdiction from which it was relocated’ and that this meets with approval
of the North Carolina Historical Commission. See online at https://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/
2015/Bills/Senate/PDF/S22v5.pdf (visited 12 December 2018).
96 R. Fausset, ‘Stone Mountain: The Largest Confederate Monument Problem in the World’, New
York Times, 18 October 2018.
97 See online at https://www.wlu.edu/presidents-office/issues-and-initiatives/commission-on-in-
stitutional-history-and-community/report-of-the-commission-on-institutional-history-and-
community (visited 12 December 2018).
98 United Daughters of the Confederacy, North Carolina Division (1906), Minutes of the 11th
annual convention, available online at https://archive.org/details/minutesofannualc1909unit
(visited 12 December 2018).
99 ‘In Memorial to Carolina’sWar Dead’, Carolina Alumni Review, 25 April 2007.
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group of protestors ç freedom fighters to some, a wild mob to others. One media
report indicates that: ‘As the monument toppled, protesters [were] seen kicking its
head and pouring earth over it’.100 A photograph, included below, captures the
moment.
Copyright JuliaWall/The News & Observer via Associated Press, with permission
What about the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s statue in Baghdad ç one of the
iconic images of the Iraq war ç and which served no military advantage whatso-
ever? Would that become a war crime? What about the dismantling, gouging, and
removal of all those statues to Lenin and Stalin that occurred in post-communist
transitions throughout Eastern Europe? Were the Czechs and Poles, and many
others, under a duty to preserve these monuments and keep them in place? Under
decommunization policies in Ukraine, Soviet era monuments were melted down,
broken, stored in warehouses, stolen or sunk off the Crimean coast. In Budapest,
Soviet commemorative statuary was not destroyed but, instead, relocated to a
park on the outskirts of the city called Szoborpark (‘Memento Park’) where they
can still be visited. Is the Hungarian ‘way’, then, now the ‘right’ way?
Protection of cultural property may come to interface awkwardly with tran-
sitional justice. As Posner notes: ‘The history of iconoclasm is long: are all
iconoclastic movements to be condemned because they destroy cultural prop-
erty?’101 When Lemkin initially proposed the crime of ‘vandalism’ in 1933,
Aron Trainin, professor of criminal law at Moscow University, denounced this
suggested crime because ‘revolutionary fighting was incompatible with the
100 See online at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/21/us/unc-silent-sam-monument-toppled.
html (visited 12 December 2018).
101 Posner, supra note 55, at 9.
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protection of historical monuments’.102 How to distinguish intentional attacks
on Sufi shrines by Salafists, declared a crime in Al Mahdi and condemned in
The Hague? How to analogize? Who to convict? Who not to charge? Following
the Al Mahdi case, it may be that the international legal imagination offers
less in the way of support for toppling and destroying cultural property which
comes to be seen in the prevailing Zeitgeist as offensive, degenerate, or abusive.
9. Conclusion
This thought-piece essay traces some of the discursive implications of the Al
Mahdi case. This essay is concerned with what the ICC did in Al Mahdi (and
what it might have done differently or otherwise), but is far more preoccupied
with positing what Al Mahdi (as is) might mean as a touchstone and reference
point for future conversations. Interrogatory in tone, this essay builds upon
the excellent scholarship the Journal of International Criminal Justice has pub-
lished regarding Al Mahdi proceedings103 by extending the analytic lens into
new places and varied spaces.
Prosecutor Bensouda’s opening that culture is important because ‘culture is
who we are’ initiated a criminal case but, along the way, ignited a journey
that opens up a whole lot more. This essay aims to speculate about this ‘whole
lot more’.Whether mindfully or inadvertently, the work product of the ICC in
theAl Mahdi case adds flavour to ongoing debates regarding the protection, re-
moval, defacement, relocation, display and destruction of cultural heritage in
all forms: monuments, artefacts, language instruction, art and literature. The
Al Mahdi judgment and reparations order could be marshalled by stakeholders
in such debates ç which range well beyond The Hague and criminal court-
rooms ç to embolden their cause(s), whatever these may be. Indeed, there is
something in Al Mahdi to suit a broad array of arguments, including ones that
might surprise and others that might seem to be at odds with the progressive
and linear ‘arcs of justice’ favoured by human rights activists. Al Mahdi em-
powers certain claims to cultural property protection as it weakens others ç
it gives as it takes.
102 Weiss-Wendt, supra note 91, at 14. For discussion rooted in the South African experiences of
colonialism and apartheid, see L. Lixinski, ‘Cultural Heritage Law and Transitional Justice:
Lessons from South Africa’, 9 International Journal of Transitional Justice (2015) 278^296.
103 Brammertz, Hughes, Kipp, and Tomljanovich, supra note 8; Capone, supra note 3; Vlasic and
Turku, supra note 11; P. Casaly, ‘Al Mahdi before the ICC: Cultural Property and World
Heritage in International Criminal Law’, 14 JICJ (2016) 1199^1220; S.A. Green Mart|¤ nez,
‘Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Northern Mali: A Crime Against Humanity?’ 13 JICJ
(2016) 1075^1097.
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